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Abstract— Multicast research has explored the security 
challenges faced in group communications. Multicast transport 
and multicast security need to work in close collaboration to 
realise a multicast service. However, there has been 
comparatively little work to combine the two technologies. In this 
paper the authors is presenting an example of partially 
integrating Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication 
(TESLA) protocol and the File Delivery over Unidirectional 
Transport (FLUTE) protocol. The security concern raised by the 
proposed algorithm is analysed for satellite network. The 
proposed algorithm was implemented on a testbed with multicast 
tunnel between University of Surrey and University of Aberdeen 
and the results are presented in this paper. 
Keywords—Multicast security, satellite networks, TESLA, 
FLUTE, integration 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
IP multicast provides a way to simultaneously disseminate 
the same packet data to a group of clients. This enables a 
sender to transmit a single copy of the data, relying on the 
network to replicate the packets as and when required along the 
delivery tree towards the receivers. This allows multicast 
networks to serve large numbers of clients without wasting 
network capacity. 
Many satellite systems natively support IP multicast [1], 
allowing connected systems to take advantage of the wide-
coverage of most satellite down-link footprints. Furthermore, 
the cost of transmission is independent of the number of 
receivers; making multicast cost-effective, especially when low 
cost receive-only terminals are used. Such terminals support 
unidirectional transmission (i.e. there is no return path).  
To reliably and securely transmit data over satellite using 
multicast requires close collaboration between the multicast 
transport technologies and the multicast security technologies. 
The possibility of (partially) integrating both technologies 
presents potential gains in the efficiency of transmission. This 
paper examines how Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant 
Authentication (TESLA) [2], a multicast security method, can 
be integrated with File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport 
(FLUTE) [3], a multicast transport framework from the 
Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) family, providing 
unidirectional file transmission over IP networks. 
FLUTE has been designed using Building Block (BB) 
architecture. The reliability and congestion control 
functionalities of FLUTE are provided by the Asynchronous 
Layered Coding (ALC) framework [4] with the Layered 
Coding Transport (LCT) BB [5] for session management. 
FLUTE itself provides a mechanism for signalling and 
mapping the properties of files to the concepts of ALC in a way 
that allows receivers to assign parameters for received objects. 
It is designed to work both with Any Source Multicast (ASM) 
[6] and Source Specific Multicast (SSM) [7] service models. 
FLUTE transmits session initiation information in-band using a 
special object called File Delivery Table (FDT). Receivers can 
distinguish the FDT from File objects using the Transmission 
Object Identification (TOI) filed in the LCT header.  
FDT messages are periodically transmitted to all potential 
receivers in the FLUTE session. An FDT instance consists of 
the Header, which forms a part of the LCT header extension 
(EXT_FDT), and the Payload that consists of one or more file 
description entries composed and structured in accordance to 
an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) scheme. The TOI=0 in 
the EXT_FDT tells the receiver that FDT is in the payload.  
The FLUTE sender encodes the File for reliability using 
Forward Error Correction (FEC) and starts transmission based 
on the Transmission Session ID (TSI) and the TOI values 
extracted from the FDT. The commonly used FEC schemes are 
Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) [8], Reed Solomon [9], and 
no-code FEC. After the receiver obtains sufficient packets to 
decode an object the receiver leaves the session. The FEC 
Payload ID header in each packet determines the FEC symbol 
within a block.  
ALC, and hence FLUTE, can transmit data using multiple 
multicast groups each at a rate defined by the sender. This 
allows receivers with differing capabilities behind a network 
bottleneck to subscribe to a suitable number of groups. 
Receivers can join and leave groups according to the perceived 
congestion condition along the path.  
         
A secure group communication system only allows 
authorized members to send objects to a group. Receivers 
check the identity of the source to authenticate each packet 
before accepting it. This procedure is called source 
authentication. Source authentication is trivial in a point-to-
point communication system: the two communication parties 
can use one pair of keys to authenticate each other. In group 
communications, a group key is shared by all group members, 
which makes it challenging to identify the message source and 
determine its authorization. This authentication is even more 
challenging when authorized sources are changing. Several 
solutions have been proposed based on Message Authentication 
Code (MAC) and digital signature technologies for single 
source authentication in a multicast group [10] [9] [11] [12] 
[13].  
TESLA [2], one of the source authentication approaches, is 
a standards-track method developed by the Multicast Security 
(Msec) working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF). It offers efficient source authentication using MAC, 
rather than a digital signature. It manages to trade time with 
source authentication in an untrusted group using a one way 
key chain.  
The basic idea of the TESLA system is to achieve 
asymmetric cryptography by delaying the disclosure of the 
symmetric keys. The whole transmission time is divided into 
time intervals and packets sent in each interval have MACs 
using the same key. The key for interval i will be disclosed to 
all users in interval i+d. The receiver is responsible for 
buffering packets until the key for their authentication has been 
disclosed. After disclosure the receiver can authenticate the 
packet, provided that the packet was received before the key 
was disclosed. TESLA requires loose time-synchronization 
between receivers and the source as well as a bootstrap 
procedure to configure both receivers and sources before the 
data transmission.  
Many research efforts have been put on FLUTE with 
reference to multicast security protocols such as TESLA. None 
of them considered how exactly these two protocols can be 
integrated to provide both reliability and security optimized. 
And none of them provided solutions for TESLA 
synchronization for unidirectional file transmissions. This 
paper is presenting solutions for these two issues by focusing 
on integrating TESLA with FLUTE with a view of applying in 
satellite networks. 
The paper is organized into five sections. The first section 
provides a brief introduction to FLUTE and TESLA. The 
second section presents how to integrate the TESLA bootstrap 
within the FLUTE FDT object with a synchronization 
mechanism for TESLA using FLUTE. The third section present 
s the security consideration of the proposed synchronization 
algorithm in satellite networks. The fourth section is the 
implementation of the proposed algorithm on a testbed with 
positive results. Finally, a conclusion is drawn. 
II. THE INTEGRATION OF TESLA AND FLUTE 
The main idea of the integration of TESLA and FLUTE has 
been presented in [14] in details. We only give a brief here to 
recall the method proposed there. 
 For a file unidirectional transport application using 
multicast, authentications are needed for receivers to 
authenticate sources. It includes the need of receivers 
authenticating whether a data message is from the real sender 
and whether a FDT for FLUTE from the authorized sender. 
Unlike the encryption in link layer in a satellite network, the 
authentication mechanism is for user authentication which is an 
end-to-end approach and it can be applied in transport layer to 
protect only the user data content while saving data processing 
powers comparing applying to lower layer. Therefore, the 
source authentication mechanism proposed here can be 
integrated with the reliability transport protocol, FLUTE, at 
transport layer. 
Integrating with FLUTE provides TESLA a lightweight 
synchronization method without restrict requirements on time 
accuracy. FLUTE periodically transmits the FDT message to 
enable receivers to join a session, which can be used as a 
“timing” loop for synchronization. It makes the 
synchronization dependent on the protocol, rather than a real-
time clock. It overcomes the issue of delay from buffering and 
makes it less sensitive to actual transmission rate. 
Time synchronization is needed in TESLA in the safe 
packet test step. If the receivers and the sources have a 
common start point (for example the synchronization point in 
FLUTE), the real-time clock time may be ignored. The formula 
used in IETF RFC 4082 for the safe packet test, which is the 
highest interval the sender could possibly be currently in: x = 
floor ((t_j - T_0) / T_int), uses the receivers current local time 
minus the session start time T_0 with the assumption that 
receivers have gain synchronization with sources. Therefore, if 
T'_0 is the time when the receivers received the FIRST (the 
first packet sent to the group, marked by a sequence number or 
special header field) data packet from the source in the 
beginning of a session, we can use the non-clock-synchronized 
receiver local time t_j, marked by the lower layer to the packet, 
minus the time T'_0 to replace the (t_j - T_0) in the above 
formula to calculate highest interval index x the sender could 
possibly be in. 
The proposed source authentication mechanism improves 
the transmission efficiency by partially integrating TESLA and 
FLUTE. It uses this new synchronization mechanism in a 
unidirectional satellite network so that the TESLA 
bootstrapping message and the FLUTE FDT message can be 
combined into one signaling procedure. It saves the 
transmission overhead and simplified the security 
requirements, i.e. only one signaling protocol need 
authentication instead of two.  
III. THE SECURITY CONSIDERATION 
The proposed loose synchronization raises security concern 
.If the FDT messages is delayed by attackers between the 
satellite and the end user, the synchronization will fail. The 
recommended synchronization methods in the TESLA RFCs, 
both direct and indirect, face the same threat. This section is to 
analyze the possibility and impact of such attacks. The attack is 
analysed here in two scenarios where requirements for 
launching such attacks are stated and different factors are 
analyzed that can decide if it can be detected. 
         
A. Scenario 1 
Attack starts before the receiver terminal joins the satellite 
network.  
 Physical layer: attacker signal is high enough to 
suppress the original satellite signal received power, 
but low enough not to saturate the receiver terminal's 
amplifier.  Our experiments showed that the attacker 
should generate the signal 19dB higher to override the 
satellite signal. 
 Link layer: attacker will repeat all carrier signals 
sending by the satellite. That means he will act as a 
satellite hub, which is very difficult to do. He will 
delay only the multicast signals the receiver interested, 
which means he knows the receiver will join the 
multicast channel later.  
 Attacker need to make the receiver believe the signal 
he forwarded is from the satellite. He can achieve this 
only if all relative signals are delivered without 
modification.  This is a sort of hijack of the satellite 
HUB. However, he will not be able to make the receive 
join a faked satellite network generated by him because 
the real satellite HUB should sign all the messages 
using a secret key. 
 If the attacker achieved all the above goals, the 
integrity protection will be down.   
B. Scenario2 
Attack starts after the receiver terminal joins the satellite 
network. 
 Physical layer: same as scenario 1. But it will be 
detected immediately by the terminal because the S/N 
ratio suddenly changed. 
 Link layer: attacker will repeat all carrier signals 
sending by the satellite. That means he will act as a 
satellite hub.. He have to delay only the multicast 
signals the receiver interested, otherwise the terminal 
will loss the satellite connection due to lack of 
reception of keep-live messages in the right time. 
However, his step-in can be immediately detected by 
the terminal because same messages received multiple 
times.  
 Attacker will have difficulty to cheat the receiver 
terminal that his signal is the original satellite signal in 
both physical layer and link layer. 
 If the attacker achieved all the above goals, the 
integrity protection will be down.   
The conclusion is that such replay attack is very difficult to 
launch in terms of both equipment and receiver activity 
prediction (It is much easier to destroy the receiver’s terminal 
physically.). Such attack can be immediately detected by the 
receiver terminal in the scenario 2. It can break the TESLA 
authorization procedure in scenario 1 if the attacker can really 
launch such attack. He can cause more damage than a DoS 
attack with the right authentication key he received before the 
end users. The attacker can simply cause more serious DoS 
attack by purely suppressing the original satellite signal 
received power on the receiver’s terminal or even burn down 
the amplifier of the receiver terminal using extreme high power 
transmission.  
Hence, it can not be a real serious threat to the proposed 
TESLA synchronization algorithm, which is the only way of 
doing so in a unidirectional satellite network without using any 
other third party timing services. 
In the commercial broadcasting services, such attack is not 
a serious threat due to the very limited receiver will be affected 
and an attacker will not benefit much from this kind of attack. 
In our multicasting services, such attack will not result in 
serious damage as well. Purely from research point of view, it 
can be easily solved as well by adding timestamp to each 
satellite data frame on the satellite HUB. Any delay can be 
immediately detected on the receiver terminal due to the 
synchronization between it and the HUB. The point is that this 
extra timestamp will cost money and it is not worth for such a 
weak threat. 
However, for a Digital Video Broadcasting - Satellite 
services to Handhelds (DVB-SH) service, this attack could be 
much more serious where the attacker can jam a terrestrial 
relay station which will affect hundreds of users in its coverage. 
That can be a serious Deny of Service (DoS) attack. The 
attacker can also use high transmission power to suppress the 
relay station’s signal and pretend to be a relay. Such attack can 
be more difficult to detect because terrestrial relay signal is 
expected besides the original satellite signal. 
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION 
The proposed integrated authentication mechanism has 
been implemented in C# and validated on a testbed. The 
implemented contains two pieces of software: the sender and 
the receiver. The sender generates FDT messages and adds new 
tags to it as proposed in section II and periodically multicast 
them to a pre-defined multicast channel. It also generates a one-
way key chain using SHA1 function provided in C# with key 
size of 20 bytes. The key chain is used to calculate the MAC 
for each data packet during the FLUTE session. The following 
is a FDT example with TESLA parameters: 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> 
<FDT-Instance> 
  <File maxOccurs="Unbound"> 
    <Content-Location>file7.txt</Content-Location> 
    <TOI>0</TOI> 
    <Expires>633727989608437500</Expires> 
    <Interval-Duration>3</Interval-Duration> 
    <Key-Chain-Length>20</Key-Chain-Length> 
    <Interval-Start-Time>633727989518437500</Interval-Start-
Time> 
    <Interval-Index>7</Interval-Index> 
    <Key-Disclosure-Delay>3</Key-Disclosure-Delay> 
    
<Key>221:198:145:53:161:69:38:24:165:77:37:86:48:48:238:18
0:177:242:98:150:</Key> 
  </File> 
</FDT-Instance> 
         
The interval length in above code is 3 seconds. The key 
chain length is 20. The session start time is 
633727989518437500s. The current interval index is 7, the key 
disclosure delay is 3 and the last key of the key chain is 
“221:198:145:53:161:69:38:24:165:77:37:86:48:48:238:180:17
7:242:98:150”. Such a FDT message was sent to the multicast 
group in the beginning of each time interval. The sender also 
repacks the packet as shown in table 1 in [14] and sends it to 
another predefined multicast group. 
On the receiver side, the software listen to the FDT in the 
corresponding multicast group when it joins the session and 
gets synchronized with the sender using the proposed method 
and carries out the packet safe test upon each coming packet 
using the formula described in section III in [14]. The whole 
process of the sender and the receiver can be shown in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1.  The implemented integration of TESLA and FLUTE 
The implementation has been validated on a testbed which 
connected two networks in University of Surrey (UniS) and 
University of Aberdeen (UoA) respectively. In the UniS, a 
Cisco 2811-sec/k9 router is connected to the internet via our 
university to UoA where locates a Rendezvous Point (RP). The 
Cisco router was used as a designated router (DR) with a 
computer running sender in UniS and the other computer 
running receiver in UoA. A Generic Routing Encapsulation 
(GRE) tunnel is established between the DR and the RP in 
order to carry the multicast sessions. 
In the experiments, the sender and the receiver is no 
synchronized using any method recommended by [2]. Their 
time is 1hour and 4 minutes different. The result shows that the 
proposed algorithm works well when the source and receiver is 
not timely synchronized and bandwidth has been saved with 
the integrated approach. Figure2 and Figure 3 show the 
integrated authentication implementation works well on two 
machines, acting as source and receiver respectively, that have 
different local times. In Figure 2, the sender output the data, the 
disclosed key, and the MAC for the last packet it sent in the 
time interval 4. After that, it displayed the 5th FDT it sent in 
the 5th interval with the correct interval index. The clock at the 
right side of Figure 2 shows the current local time is 09:39:56. 
Figure 3 shows the output result on the receiver side that 
displayed the data has been successfully received for the last 
packet sent in the interval 4 after it passed the 4 steps of safe 
packet test where its local time, shown at the right side of the 
figure, is 10:43:26, which is different from the sender’s time. 
 
Figure 2.  Screen shot on sender computer 
 
Figure 3.  Screen shot on receiver computer 
In additional to the synchronization success, the proposed 
algorithm is expected to save bandwidth after combining the 
TESLA bootstrapping signalling and the FLUTE FDT 
signaling and the test results proved it. 
 
Figure 4.  Screen shot on receiver computer 
 
Figure 5.  Screen shot on receiver computer 
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Figure 4 shows a Wireshark capture result that 36010 bytes 
have been transported in a short time slot around 1 minute 
using a separated FLUTE and TESLA approach. Figure 5 
shows the same session but using integrated approach as 
proposed that only transmitted 35086 bytes. The integrated 
approach saved about 2% bandwidth to transmit the same 
mount of data. It is because the separated approach introduced 
more overhead for more signaling packets. In our test, there are 
not much data were generated which definitely contribute the 
figure of bandwidth saving. However, in a satellite network, 
extra signaling implies more overhead due to the encapsulation 
and MPEG TS header. Moreover, if we use integrity protection 
to the separated signaling procedures, the overhead will get 
even bigger. So our algorithm does help save the expensive 
bandwidth in a satellite network. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the use of TESLA with FLUTE, 
considering the building block architecture, use of congestion 
control and FEC building blocks. In the proposed method, the 
FLUTE File Delivery Table, FDT, object is used to convey the 
TESLA bootstrap information. A new synchronization 
mechanism is proposed that eliminates the requirement for 
using a time server. This method is particularly attractive in a 
unidirectional transmission environment, (e.g. a satellite 
network without a return channel).  
Security concern has been analyzed in terms of man-in-the-
middle attack that can override the satellite signal and gain 
users trust to fail both the proposed synchronization and the 
recommended synchronization method in TESAL RFCs. The 
result showed that such kind of attack is extremely difficult and 
will not have serious impact in the commercial satellite 
broadcast/multicast networks. 
The proposed algorithm has been implemented using C# 
and validated on an inter-university testbed. The test result 
shows that the proposed algorithm works successfully and it 
saves bandwidth comparing with the separated TESLA and 
FLUTE approach. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The work presented in this paper is sponsored by the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), 
UK, within the Satellite-Based Secure Multicast Employing 
Hybrid Reliability project, and the European Satellite 
Communications Network of Excellence (SatNEx) project. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Z. Sun, M. P. Howarth, H. Cruickshank, S. Iyengar, and L. Claverotte, 
"Networking issues in IP Multicast over Satellite", International Journal 
of Satellite Communications and Networking, vol. 21, pp. 489-507, July 
2003 
[2] A. Perrig, D. Song, R. Canetti, J. D. Tygar, and B. Briscoe, “Timed 
Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA): Multicast 
Source Authentication Transform Introduction”, IETF RFC 4082, June 
2005 
[3] T. Paila, R. Walsh, M. Luby, R. Lehtonen, and V. Roca, “FLUTE - File 
Delivery over Unidirectional Transport,” IETF Work in progress, 
October 2007. 
[4] M. Luby, Watson, L. Vicisano, “Asynchronous Layered Coding Protocol 
Instantiation”, IETF Work in progress, November 2007. 
[5] M. Luby, Watson, L. Vicisano, “Layered Coding Transport (LCT) 
Building Block”, IETF Work in progress, November 2007  
[6] S. Deering, "Host Extensions for IP Multicasting," IETF RFC 1112, 
August 1989. 
[7] H. Holbrook, "A Channel Model for Multicast", in Department of 
Computer Science, Stanford University, California  2001. 
[8] R. Vincent, "INRIA,"  http://planete-bcast.inrialpes.fr 
[9] Rosario Gennaro and Pankaj Rohatgi, “How to sign Digital Streams”, 
Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO ’97, pp. 180-197, August 1997 
[10] Ran Canetti, Juan Garay, Gene Itkis, Daniele Micciancio, Moni Naor, 
and Benny Pinkas, “Multicast Security: A Taxonomy and some efficient 
Constructions”, INFOCOM’99, March 1999 
[11] C. K. Wong and S. Lam, “Digital Signatures for Flows and Multicasts”, 
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 7, No. 4, August 1999 
[12] P. Rohatgi, “A Compact and Fast Hybrid Signature Scheme for 
Multicast Packets”, 6th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, Singapore, November 1999 
[13] S. Even, O. Goldreich, and S. Micali, “On-Line/Off-Line Digital 
Signatures”, Journal of Cryptology, 9(1), pp. 35-67, 1996 
[14] L. Liang, H. Cruickshank, Z. Sun, C. Kulatunga and G. Fairhurst, 
“TESLA with FLUTE over Satellite Networks,” 2008 IEEE 
International Conference on Communications (ICC2008), Beijing, 
China, 19-22 May 2008. 
 
